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Abstract 
 While malicious software (malware) is designed to disrupt or damage computer systems, 
potentially unwanted applications (PUAs) combine useful features with less desirable ones, such 
as adware or spyware. Unlike anti-malware solutions, removing PUAs can be controversial, for 
both the PUA owners and also the users who might wish to accept the PUA features. Thus, 
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solutions for removing PUAs require users to make their removal decisions. In this paper we 
investigate the effectiveness of 15 screen variants that use different “security warning attractors” 
designed to encourage users to enable PUA detection when they are installing a security software 
solution from the online security software company ESET. Our live field study with close to 
750,000 software installations by end users in 222 countries shows that a small change of 
switching the order of the options presented using radio buttons and offering the “enable 
detection” option first was the most effective (and was later set as the option of choice by ESET). 
The chosen approach led to a significant reduction of non-consenting users from 17.9% to 11.1%. 
Other features, such as the use of colours and pictorials, which have previously demonstrated 
their effectiveness with more traditional SSL security warnings, did not yield significant 
improvements for enabling PUA detection. 
Keywords: usable security; potentially unwanted application; attractor; security software; user 
decision 
 
1. Introduction 
 Potentially unwanted applications (PUAs, a.k.a. potentially unwanted programs, PUPs), 
cover several arguably malicious families of software such as adware, spyware, pornware, 
bundleware or junkware. Differing from malicious software (malware), PUAs often combine a 
potentially useful feature with arguably less desirable features that deliver unwanted ads, monitor 
users’ behaviour or collect their data [1]. 
 Many online security software solutions (e.g., endpoint antivirus with some additional 
features) include a service to detect and alert users about PUAs targeting their devices. However, 
automatically classifying an application as a PUA can be challenging, in part due to the different 
perceptions of what constitutes an “unwanted” application. For example, some PUAs might be 
knowingly installed by users, such as with browser toolbars that are sometimes packaged with 
software. Even benign applications (such as remote desktop controllers or various registry 
cleaners) can contain functions that would be identified as unwanted by some users. However, 
automatically classifying such software as “unwanted” for all users can create confusion that 
could cause users to lose trust in PUA classification decisions. Further, as several example 
encounters have shown, well-established adware companies do not hesitate to sue security 
software vendors for automatically classifying their software as adware [2]. 
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 These circumstances pose a unique challenge for security software vendors who want to 
protect their users and facilitate PUA detection, but who might be legally restricted from 
automatically removing a PUA. The approach chosen by vendors has been to involve users in the 
decision of labeling applications as unwanted, before removing them from their system. In this 
way, the approach to involve the user in PUA decisions is similar to what is done for security 
warnings, for example for phishing [3], SSL warnings [4] or malware [5]. While there has been 
much recent focus on such security warnings, there has surprisingly been little research 
undertaken so far in user decisions for PUA warnings. 
 There are two stages of user involvement with PUAs. First, there is a choice about 
whether or not to enable the detection of PUAs in users’ security software. Second, if PUA 
detection is enabled, there are decisions about whether or not to accept or reject an individual 
application identified as a PUA. In this paper, we focus on the first stage. 
 A 2016 survey [6] with 2,022 participants found that 73% of people who changed default 
security software settings (from 41.2% of all research participants) also enabled PUA detection. 
However, the study used users’ self-reports, which may lead to inaccurate estimation of PUA 
detection enablement. 
 In our previous study [1] we collected system installation data from a large set of beta 
testers and found out that overall, 74.7% of beta testers enabled PUA detection. Since beta testers 
may differ from standard end users in terms of their IT abilities, and consequently their ICT 
related behaviour, repeating research with standard end users is necessary [7]. 
 In this paper, we present the results of our study of the effectiveness of 15 variants with 
different “attractors” that were designed for encouraging users to enable the detection of PUAs. 
The attractors consist of different interface modifications, similar to those studied for security 
warnings. 
 Each of 748,795 end users were presented with a single randomly chosen variant when 
installing an online security software solution from security software company ESET. We report 
the decisions of our end-user participants to enable the detection of PUAs, as well as the time 
they spent on each screen to make their decision. 
 The following section describes the dataset, introduces our data cleaning and analytical 
strategy, and presents the 15 designed variants. Section 3 reports on the effect of the attractors on 
users’ decisions to enable the detection of PUAs. In Section 4, the issue of time spent on the 
Page 3 of 22
variants’ screens is examined. Study limitations and related research on PUAs are discussed in 
Section 5 and 6. Section 7 then concludes our article. 
2. Methods 
 Our study was conducted in cooperation with ESET, an online security software 
company with over 100 million users in more than 200 countries and territories
1
. During the 
installation process, ESET presents a screen dialogue that asks users to either enable or disable 
the detection of PUAs. This step cannot be skipped and thus each user has to choose one option 
or the other, although it is possible to change this decision later in the software settings. 
 For our experiment, we prepared 15 different screen variants (14 new approaches and 1 
control variant (A1) – see Figures 1 and 2) of the PUA enable/disable screen with various 
attractors. One variant was randomly selected for display to each user during the installation 
process. We selected and tested five basic approaches to guide the design of our 15 variants 
based on well-known user dialog and security warning design principles (see Subsection 6.2) 
The particular options and settings underwent both discussions between the research team and 
ESET, as well as formal approval processes of ESET. 
 Table 1 shows each approach (attractor type) along with the corresponding variants used 
with that approach. Some screens combined multiple features; see Table 2 for a concise 
description of what features were included in each variant. See Figures 1 and 2 for the visual 
representation of the PUA dialog variants. 
 The screens were written in English and were thus presented to the users during 
installation of the English version of the security software. Note that ESET did not impose any 
limitation on downloading the English software version to particular continents or countries. For 
each installation, we collected information about users’ decisions to enable or disable PUA 
detection in the installation process, and the time the users spent on the screen with the PUA 
dialog. The data was collected from October 2016 to February 2017 and came from 748,795 
end-user installations
2
 of ESET security software solution for Microsoft Windows OS spread 
across 222 countries. 
2.1. Analytical strategy 
                                                 
1
https://www.eset.com/int/about/ 
2We refer to “end user installations” since we were not able to completely control multiple 
installations by the same user – see Subsection 2.2. 
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 During the analysis, we first used the omnibus χ2 test to discover whether there were 
overall differences in the rate of enabling PUA detection among the screen variants, and then 
planned to proceed with pairwise comparisons to examine the specific effects of each attractor. 
Analysing such large sample sizes leads to inflated significance tests, thus we also calculated 
Cramer’s V (φc) to better assess the effect sizes; the value of 0.1 is considered as small, 0.3 as 
medium and 0.5 as a large effect size [8]. Next, we focused on the time spent on each screen. It is 
well known that users tend not to read the text in dialog windows [9], hence we were interested 
in examining whether users in our sample spent a sufficient amount of time on the screens in 
order to have the chance of actually reading them. Admittedly, merely spending enough time 
cannot be equated to reading the text, which poses a limit to the interpretation of the findings. 
However, spending significantly less than a “sufficient amount of time” can be interpreted as not 
reading the (entire) text. Thus, since the screens differed in the number of words (ranging from 
29 to 123 words), we compared the time spent on each screen to the time that an average adult 
would spend reading the respective number of words. According to Taylor [10], the average 
reading speed for English is 200-250 words per minute. In order not to underestimate the users’ 
reading speed, we chose to use the higher speed (250 words per minute) to calculate the needed 
time for each screen (see Table 3 and more details in Section 4). Then, a one-sample t-test was 
used to test the differences between the time needed (used as population average) and time 
actually spent on each screen. 
2.2. Data cleaning 
 The original dataset obtained from ESET included data from 799,450 end-user 
installations (cases). To clean the dataset, we first excluded the cases with ESET’s internal IP 
address (N = 275). Furthermore, in an attempt to remove multiple installations from the same 
computing device, the duplicate entries were deleted. These were identified by combining 
hardware features, IP addresses, and hashed MAC addresses (N = 50,380), leaving the final 
dataset of N = 748,795 installations (thereby removing approximately 6% of the entries from the 
original dataset). 
 In the original dataset, the “time spent” data from each screen was highly skewed: the 
values ranged from 0 seconds to 563 hours with a mean of 48.41 seconds (SD = 3,378.549), 
median of 10 seconds and mode of 3. The longer durations may have had two causes: users could 
have left the dialog window open and the computer running while they were doing something 
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completely different, or the time could have been wrongly recorded in some cases. This was 
however true for only a small amount of data. To clean the time data of these cases, we thus 
omitted the highest 1% of the values from each screen, removing 7,529 cases from the time 
analyses. For the resultant data, the average “time spent” duration decreased to 16.625 seconds 
(SD = 21.976, range 0 to 299 seconds). The mode and median remained the same. 
3. Findings 
 The omnibus χ2 test showed significant differences among the tested variants (χ2(14) = 
2,984.057; p < 0.001), hence we continued with the planned pairwise tests. We performed two 
levels of comparison. Firstly, we compared screens that were similar in appearance, with the 
exception of presence or absence of a distinct attractor (for example, presence or absence of a 
pictorial), which we discuss in each of the subsections below. Secondly, we compared all 
variants of the attractors with the control, for which results are presented in Table 2. This table 
also shows the detection rates across examined screen variants. Each subsection below describes 
detailed results for each of our five design approaches. 
3.1. Text structure 
Paragraph text. The following paragraph was used to explain PUAs to end users: “ESET can 
detect potentially unwanted applications and ask for confirmation before they install. Potentially 
unwanted applications might not pose a security risk but they can affect computer’s performance, 
speed and reliability, or cause changes in behaviour. They usually require user’s consent before 
installation.” We tested whether the presence (screen B2) or absence (E4) of this explanation 
(when used with the same order of options presented, using radio buttons for enabling or 
disabling PUA detection) made a difference and found a negligible effect (χ2(1) = 19.887; φ = 
0.014, p < 0.001), slightly in favor of presence of the explanation (82.2% vs. 81.1%). 
Bullet points. We re-arranged the paragraph text explaining PUAs into bullets to increase its 
readability (the content remained the same). The bullet points in the text version (screen A2) had 
a negligible positive effect on the detection rate that was 0.5% higher (χ2(1) = 4.515; φ = 0.007, p 
< 0.05) over the use of a paragraph (screen A1). 
3.2. Purpose stressing 
PUA example. The example of a potentially unwanted application risk was presented on screen 
B1. The exact wording was “For example, they may change your web browser’s web page and 
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search settings.” When compared to the control screen (A1), no significant difference was found 
(p > 0.05). 
External link. Two versions of the external link were used: one read “What is a potentially 
unwanted application?” (B2) and we also explored the effect of less text in the link description 
“Why do we ask?” (B3). Both hyperlinks lead to the same page3 with a detailed explanation of 
PUAs and examples provided, and also what happens when a PUA is detected. First, we 
compared screens B2 and B3 with the control variant (A1). Next, we compared screens B2 and 
B3 to see whether the formulation of the link made a difference. These comparisons did not 
reveal any significant differences (p > 0.05). This suggests that neither the presence nor wording 
of the external link impacts a user’s decision to enable PUA detection. 
 Further, we explored the effect of clicks on the link. In total, six screens included a 
hyperlink (N = 299,419) with 7.5% (N = 22,522) of users clicking on it. Screens E3 and E4, that 
did not include the PUA explanation, resulted in 10% and 11% of users clicking on the link, 
whereas for other screens, the average click rate was approximately 6% (the differences between 
screens E3 and E4, as well as the differences between screens B2, B3, E1 and E2 were not 
significant, while the differences between E3 and E4 and the other screens (including screens 
without hyperlink) were significant with φ ranging from 0.089 to 0.096). In all screens with links, 
clicking users enabled PUA detection more often, with very similar effect sizes on each screen – 
hence, for brevity, we present only overall rates across all six screens: 88.7% of users clicking on 
the link enabled PUA detection, whereas 81.0% of non-clicking users did (χ2(1) = 826.897, φ = 
0.053, p < 0.001). 
 This might lead one to conclude that providing more information through a hyperlink is 
an effective way for users to learn about PUAs, while also increasing the PUA enablement rate. 
However, note that it was only a small percentage of participants (6%) who clicked on the 
explanation link. Therefore, even though there was a higher tendency of these users to choose to 
enable PUA detection, we don’t believe that there is currently enough data to confirm this as a 
viable design strategy. 
3.3. Attention raising 
 Graphic attractors were used in three screens: C1 (red signal word “Notice” at the start of 
the text description), C2 (triangle with a black exclamation mark – the ANSI-inspired pictorial), 
                                                 
3
http://support.eset.com/kb2629/?locale=en_US 
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and C3 (octagon-framed exclamation mark – the company’s warning pictorial). When compared 
to the control screen (A1), no significant differences were found (p > 0.05). Moreover, no 
differences were found between the two pictorials: users did not act differently on screens using 
the company warning sign and the standard ANSI-inspired pictorial, either in terms of enabling 
PUA detection, or in terms of the time spent on the screen. The ANSI-inspired pictorial is based 
on the sign that is widely used as a safety sign in both industry and software development and 
therefore it is connected with a perception of risk. For example, a yellow triangle with an 
exclamation mark serves as a warning sign for a low battery in the Android OS. 
 In our experiment, none of the graphic attractors influenced user choice – neither in terms 
of the PUA detection enabling rate nor in the time spent on the screen. Their role as attractors is 
problematic, especially in cases where the graphic covers only a small piece of the screen. 
3.4. Options order 
Query wording and order of presented options. We compared the control screen (A1; 
disable/enable) with the variant in which the options were presented in reverse order 
(enable/disable; screen D1) and found a significant difference (χ2(1) = 939.725, p < 0.001). 
Screen D1 is also the screen that prompted the most users to enable PUA detection across all 
screen variants (88.94%; see Table 2). Although the effect size is rather small (φ = 0.097, p < 
0.001), increasing the number of users who enable PUA detection by 7 percentage points is a 
substantial improvement (representing more than 53,000 of our users). 
 We also evaluated the use of alternate verbs, detect/don’t detect (and vice versa). While 
the screen with don’t detect presented as the first option (D2) lowered the users’ enablement of 
PUA detection (χ2(1) = 133.621; φ = −.037, p < 0.001) by nearly 3 percentage points, presenting 
the preferred, positive, option of detect first (D3), increased the enablement of PUA detection by 
almost 5 percentage points (χ2(1) = 457.175; φ = −0.068, p < 0.001). However, the verb enable, 
presented in the first position, performed significantly better than the verb detect (χ2(1) = 88.281; 
φ = 0.030, p < 0.001). Based on these findings, ESET has since started to use screen D1 in their 
installation process. 
3.5. Presence of another user dialog 
 This included screens E3 vs. E4 (χ2(1) = 74.394, φ = 0.027, p < 0.001) and screens E1 vs. 
E2 (χ2(1) = 3.861, p < 0.05, φ = 0.006, p < 0.005). In both comparisons, the screen without the 
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other dialog caused slightly more users to enable PUA detection. This result suggests that it may 
be beneficial not to present multiple queries to users within a single installation screen. 
3.6. Combinations 
 Since we initially expected that some combinations might strengthen the effect of the 
attractors, we designed two combined variants (screens E1 and E2). They combine the structure 
and purpose approach by including bulleted text and a hyperlink. In addition, one variant did not 
contain an additional user dialog (E1) whereas the other did (E2). Somewhat surprisingly, both 
of these variants had the opposite effect when compared to the control screen – both slightly 
decreased the rate of enabling PUA detection (screen E1: χ2(1) = 40.499; φ = −0.020, p < 0.001; 
screen E2: χ2(1) = 69.634; φ = −0.026, p < 0.001). 
 Overall, our findings suggest that the text itself and visual aids in the form of warning 
symbols do not impact users’ choice to enable PUA detection in our study; only presenting the 
preferred option in the first position mattered substantially. This raises the question of whether 
the users actually read all the text on the screen. Therefore, we further examined the users’ 
behaviour with a specific focus on the time spent on each screen. 
4. Time spent on screen 
 Before analysing the differences among users and the variants for the time spent on each 
screen, we first omitted those users who clicked on the hyperlink presented (for those variants 
that included a hyperlink), since these users were directed to a secondary webpage with a PUA 
explanation which thus prolonged their recorded time on the screen (Nclicked = 22,522). 
4.1. Differences across the screen variants 
 We observed differences in the time spent on the screen per each variant (F(14) = 
365.114, p < 0.001; see Table 3). Interestingly, the screens that users on average spent most time 
on were the screens with the smallest number of words – which is contrary to the expected result 
if we were to believe that the users actually read the text (i.e., the greater the number of words, 
the more time a user should spend on the screen). To better assess the differences among the 
screens and users’ reading habits, we compared the average time users spent on each screen to 
the time that would be needed to read the screen according to the literature with a one-sample 
t-test (see Subsection 2.1 for more details). All examined differences were significant (p < 0.001), 
and for most screens, the resultant difference was negative. This indicates that users spent 
substantially less time on a screen than would be needed to read the text – these differences 
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ranged from −2.48 (in screen E4) to −13.83 seconds (screen B1). Users spent more time than 
necessary to read the text on two screens only – 10.28 seconds more on screen E3 and 5.88 
seconds more on screen E1). For a better presentation of the time data, we coded a binary 
variable to denote whether the user had or did not have enough time to read the content on the 
screen (see also Table 3). For screen E3, consisting of 29 words, nearly 76% of users had enough 
time. From that, the rate sharply drops to less than half (46.3%) of users on screen E1, followed 
by 25.3% on screen E4 and decreasing down to 12% on screen D1. 
 Regarding the number of words on the most read screens – the most “successful” screens, 
E1 and E3, are the only screens that did not include another user dialog, and thus consisted of the 
least amount of text (64 and 29 words, respectively). It seems that users are willing to devote 
their energy to reading when they feel the costs are not too high (in terms of their effort and 
time). Interestingly, the third most read screen had 21% fewer readers than the second. This is a 
large decrease considering that the screen is only 11 words longer. It does, however, include 
another user dialog. We thus hypothesize that not only the text amount but also a number of 
different user dialogs make the difference – i.e., the users seem to spend time reading the text on 
potentially unwanted application detection when the text is short and they are not distracted (or 
discouraged) by the presence of other user dialog. 
4.2. Differences between users who enabled and did not enable PUA detection 
 We further examined whether there are differences in time spent on the screen between 
those users who enabled PUA detection and those who did not. We calculated a t-test for 
independent samples for each screen. Surprisingly, the differences were negligible: despite 
sometimes statistically significant at p-value 0.001, they did not exceed 2.2 seconds for any 
screen variant, and the average differences between those enabling and not enabling PUA 
detection across all screens were only 1.31 seconds. Another surprising finding related to 
enablement was that it was those users who decided not to enable PUA detection who seemed to 
spend a bit more time on the screens. This tendency can be observed also in the numbers of users 
who spent a sufficient amount of time on the screen – the two lowest rates (12% and 13.5%) 
were obtained on the two screens with the highest number of users enabling PUA detection 
(screen D1 and D3). 
 This finding suggests that users do not base their decisions to enable PUA detection on 
fully reading and understanding the text presented on the screen, but rather the opt for the 
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quickest way forward with the installation process. Under such conditions, designing the dialog 
screen in a way that prompts most users to choose the preferred setting (even without reading the 
text) bears crucial importance. We would thus advise security software companies to pay 
particular attention to design features and warn them not to underestimate design effects. 
5. Study limitations 
 Our study has several limitations. First, we focused on the form rather than content of the 
text, being limited by the cooperating company, ESET, namely their legal and marketing staff. 
The text comprehensibility represents an important factor in users’ decisions and we would urge 
researchers to design and test various text alterations that would increase users’ understanding 
while still remaining general enough to prevent potential legal issues. Second, we used only the 
English version of the online antivirus software and proposed screen variants. This may play a 
role in comprehension in countries where English is not a mother tongue. Third, the limitation 
set by ESET was to do only small, minor changes in the PUA user dialog. Thus, we were not 
able to influence the overall workflow of program installation. 
6. Related work 
 Related work includes PUA-oriented research and also research on influencing user 
decisions towards the safe choice through attractors, i.e., interface modifications that attempt to 
attract users’ attention and change their behaviour. 
6.1. PUA scene 
 PUAs are significant issues. For example, Kwon et al. [11] analyzed a non-trivial subset 
of VirusTotal reports from 2013, and they identified that PUAs are up to 10 times more common 
than malware. 
 PUAs also dominate in the category of signed potentially malicious applications. Kotzias 
et al. [12] analyzed 356,931 software samples from 2006 to 2015, collected mainly from 
VirusShare and other publicly available data sources. The most signed samples are PUAs 
(88%-95%) whereas malware is nearly never signed. They also observed that the number of 
PUAs in their dataset is steadily growing over time since 2011. PUAs are also highly prevalent 
in Pay-Per-Install services. Kotzias et al. [13] measured PUA prevalence on real hosts finding 
that 54% have PUAs installed. Their dataset contained more than 8 billion events on 3.9 million 
real hosts in a period of 19 months, capturing only signed PUA executables. There is also a high 
risk of PUA consequent spread because 65% PUA downloads are performed by another PUA. 
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6.2. Motivation for designed screens 
 Research on the effectiveness of security warnings has studied how different interface 
features, such as text, pictorials, and symbols can used to increase users’ attention and adherence 
to security warnings, as well as their comprehension. For example, previous work [14, 5] on SSL 
warnings demonstrates the effectiveness of well-designed warnings. In this article, we’ve 
investigated whether some of these features can help to encourage users to enable PUA 
detection. 
 For example, research suggests that text structure impacts its comprehension, since 
warning text in bullets or in an outline form is considered more readable than continuous text 
[15]. More recently, Bravo-Lillo et al. [16] found that a detailed explanation serves as a “bad 
attention” attractor. However, others [17] note that a warning containing a “purpose string” has a 
higher impact on a user over the warning without any purpose. Surprisingly, an effect of 
different content in a purpose string is statistically insignificant. In our study, providing a 
purpose and an explanation led to a significant increase in the PUA enablement rate (in 
comparison with screens where no explanation was provided). 
 While pictorials were originally important in physical security, they are currently also 
widely used in user dialogs, especially in the context of web browsers. Bold print, high contrast 
and pictorial symbols enhance the salience of visual warnings [18]. In addition, colour in a 
warning can increase its ability to attract attention [19]. Concerning our study, visual salience did 
not lead to an increase in the desired behaviour of enabling PUA detection. 
 Felt et al. [20] discuss icon shape in communicating the level of risk for security 
warnings in browsers. They found that an exclamation mark in both a triangle and a circle was 
perceived as not connected with security [20]. However, using a triangle and a circle together 
with an exclamation mark had the best results. As for the triangle, all colours seem reasonably 
well distributed, the majority in connection with orange, red and blue colour. Similar effects 
were not observed with the use of pictorials and icons in our study. In particular, we did not 
observe a statistically significant difference in variants with and without a colourful pictorial. We 
also did not observe differences in the PUA enablement rate for screens containing either of the 
two pictorials that we investigated. The triangle symbol that we used was inspired by the ISO 
graphical symbol as a typical example of a safety alert symbol that many people might be 
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familiar with. Originally, it was a symbol that indicated a potential personal injury hazard [21]. 
The ESET company’s own warning pictorial is widely used in the company’s security software. 
 Research [22] has also recommended the use of a signal word in warnings to increase 
their effectiveness. Warnings printed in red (compared to black) led to improved noticeability 
[23]. On the other hand, the usage of colour only is problematic since 8% men are colourblind 
[24]. The signal word “Notice” is recommended for use by the American National Standards 
Institute Z535 Standards on Safety Signs and Colours [25]. In our study, the word “Notice” in a 
red colour did not lead to significant increase in the PUA enablement rate. 
 With respect to the time spent on various screens, Akhawe et al. [5] compared the amount 
of time spent on a security attractor by users to their reaction to the attractor, e.g., to adhere to 
the attractor. They found that users who click through (ignore) browser security warnings spend 
less time on the warnings. While our results were not significant, we found that users who chose 
not to enable PUA detection spent a bit more time on the attractor. 
7. Conclusions 
 We analyzed several attractors in 15 screen variants of a user dialog for enabling PUA 
detection. The variants cover both textual and visual aspects previously tested and approved in 
warning design, such as attention raising, text structuring, purpose stressing, etc. We cooperated 
with the security software company ESET and collected data from about 750,000 end-user 
installations with our variants displayed during the security software installation. 
 Variant D1 scored the greatest improvement in terms of the number of users who enabled 
PUA detection, when compared to an original control dialog. This new variant is currently being 
used by online security software company ESET in their security products. We encourage further 
research in the selection of options for user interface settings as we show that even minor 
changes can cause a significant impact. 
 Summarizing the performance of features that we tested in our screen variants, the order 
of options for deciding to enable or disable PUA detection matters the most. In our study, 
presenting the enable option first (as with D1 above) leads to the highest number of users 
enabling PUA detection. In general, “attention raising” features do not lead to a significant 
improvement nor did differences in text structuring. Similarly, combinations of features that we 
tested did not lead to any significant increase of users enabling PUA detection. 
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 We also found a small portion of users to be interested in additional information 
regarding the user dialog (e.g., by following a hyperlink). These users then tend to enable PUA 
detection more than the others. 
 Users are negatively influenced by other user dialogs that are present or absent on/from 
the screen, even when the other dialog response is pre-checked by default and does not require 
any further user interaction. We believe that presenting a short single user dialog on the screen 
has a higher chance of being read by users. This would be an appropriate recommendation when 
the overall number of screens is low (in our case, the installation process consisted of five 
screens that required some user attention), but might be perceived negatively in a longer screen 
sequence. 
 As an interesting observation, we were not able to determine whether the time spent on 
the screen generally leads to increasing the PUA enablement rate. In fact, we observed a slight 
decrease in this rate with more time spent on screen. This may be caused by necessarily vague 
formulations used to describe PUAs – the descriptions could not include very specific effects of 
PUAs and not even any concrete examples, in order to avoid potential legal battles. We 
encourage future research to examine users’ understandings of such descriptions in more depth, 
such as in strict experimental settings. 
Acknowledgement 
 We thank Masaryk University (project MUNI/E/1281/2016) and ESET. 
 
References 
[1] V. Stavova, V. Matyas, M. Just, On the impact of warning interfaces for enabling the 
detection of Potentially Unwanted Applications, in: Euro Usable Security (EuroUSEC) 
Workshop Programme, 2016, ISBN: 1-891562-45-2. 
[2] M. Masnick, Gator Threatening Those Who Call Their Application Spyware, 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20031022/1420248_F.shtml, accessed: 2018-02-18 (1998). 
[3] S. Egelman, S. Schechter, The importance of being earnest [in security warnings], in: 
International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, Springer, 2013, pp. 
52–59. 
Page 14 of 22
[4] S. Fahl, M. Harbach, T. Muders, M. Smith, L. Baumgärtner, B. Freisleben, Why eve and 
mallory love android: an analysis of android ssl (in)security, in: ACM Conference on Computer 
and Communications Security, 2012. 
[5] D. Akhawe, A. P. Felt, Alice in Warningland: A Large-Scale Field Study of Browser Security 
Warning Effectiveness., in: Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium, Vol. 13, 2013. 
[6] AV Comparatives, IT Security Survey 2016, 
http://www.av-comparatives.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/security_survey2016_en.pdf, 
accessed: 2018-02-18. 
[7] V. Stavova, L. Dedkova, M. Ukrop, V. Matyas, A large-scale comparative study of beta 
testers and regular users, Communications of the ACM 61 (2) (2018) 64–71. 
[8] J. Cohen, Statistical power and analysis for the behavioral sciences (2nd ed.), Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, Inc, 1988, ISBN: 0805802835. 
[9] J. A. Obar, A. Oeldorf-Hirsch, The biggest lie on the internet: Ignoring the privacy policies 
and terms of service policies of social networking services, in: SSRN Electronic Journal, 
Proceedings of TPRC 44: The 44th Research Conference on Communication, Information and 
Internet Policy 2016, Elsevier, 2016. 
[10] S. E. Taylor, Eye movements in reading: Facts and fallacies, American Educational 
Research Journal 2 (4) (1965) 187–202. 
[11] B. J. Kwon, V. Srinivas, A. Deshpande, T. Dumitraş, Catching Worms, Trojan Horses and 
PUPs: Unsupervised Detection of Silent Delivery Campaigns, in: Proceedings of the 24th 
Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, Internet Society, 2017. 
[12] P. Kotzias, S. Matic, R. Rivera, J. Caballero, Certified PUP: abuse in authenticode code 
signing, in: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and 
Communications Security, ACM, 2015, pp. 465–478. 
[13] P. Kotzias, L. Bilge, J. Caballero, Measuring PUP prevalence and PUP distribution through 
Pay-Per-Install services, in: Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium, 2016, pp. 
739–756. 
[14] J. Sunshine, S. Egelman, H. Almuhimedi, N. Atri, L. F. Cranor, Crying Wolf: An Empirical 
Study of SSL Warning Effectiveness, in: Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium, 
2009, pp. 399–416. 
Page 15 of 22
[15] E. N. Wiebe, E. F. Shaver, M. S. Wogalter, People’s Beliefs about the Internet: Surveying 
the Positive and Negative Aspects, in: Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics 
Society Annual Meeting, Vol. 45, 2001, pp. 1186–1190. 
[16] C. Bravo-Lillo, S. Komanduri, L. F. Cranor, R. W. Reeder, M. Sleeper, J. Downs, S. 
Schechter, Your Attention Please: Designing Security-decision UIs to Make Genuine Risks 
Harder to Ignore, in: Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, 
ACM, 2013. 
[17] J. Tan, K. Nguyen, M. Theodorides, H. Negrón-Arroyo, C. Thompson, S. Egelman, D. 
Wagner, The Effect of Developer-specified Explanations for Permission Requests on 
Smartphone User Behavior, in: Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in 
Computing Systems, ACM, 2014. 
[18] M. S. Wogalter, V. C. Conzola, T. L. Smith-Jackson, Research-based guidelines for warning 
design and evaluation, in: Applied ergonomics, Vol. 33, Elsevier, 2002, pp. 219–230. 
[19] R. T. Gill, C. Barbera, T. Precht, A comparative evaluation of warning label designs, in: 
Proceedings of the Human Factors Society Annual Meeting, Vol. 31, SAGE Publications, 1987. 
[20] A. P. Felt, R. W. Reeder, A. Ainslie, H. Harris, M. Walker, C. Thompson, M. E. Acer, E. 
Morant, S. Consolvo, Rethinking connection security indicators, in: Proceedings of the Twelfth 
Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, ACM, 2016, pp. 1–14. 
[21] International Organization for Standardization, ANSI Z535 2007 Revision, 
https://www.safetysign.com/content/maincategorycontent/ansi-z535-2007.php, accessed: 
2018-02-18. 
[22] M. S. Wogalter, G. A. Fontenelle, K. R. Laughery, Behavioral effectiveness of warnings, in: 
Proceedings of the Human Factors Society Annual Meeting, Vol. 29, SAGE Publications, 1985. 
[23] C. C. Braun, L. Sansing, R. S. Kennedy, N. C. Silver, Signal word and color specifications 
for product warnings: an isoperformance application, in: Proceedings of the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, Vol. 38, SAGE Publications, 1994. 
[24] L. T. Sharpe, A. Stockman, H. Jägle, J. Nathans, Opsin genes, cone photopigments, color 
vision, and color blindness, in: Color vision: From genes to perception, 1999, ISBN: 
9780521004398. 
[25] National Electrical Manufacturers Association, Accredited Standards Committee on Safety 
Signs and Colors (1998). 
Page 16 of 22
 Figure 1: The control variant (A1) with highlighted area of PUA inquiry. 
Figure 2: PUA dialog variants. The dashed line indicates omitted parts of a user dialog, such as 
another user dialog (LG) or Back/Install buttons. 
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Table 1: Attractor variants used in experiment. 
Attractor type Variant 
A. Text structure A1. Paragraph text (the control variant). 
A2. Bullet points. 
B. Purpose stressing B1. Providing an example. 
B2. “What is a potentially unwanted 
application?” hyperlink. 
B3. “Why do we ask?” hyperlink. 
C. Attention raising C1. Signal word “Notice” in red colour. 
C2. ANSI-inspired pictorial. 
C3. Company warning pictorial. 
D. Option presentation D1. Option order. 
D2. Option wording. 
D3. Option order and wording. 
E. Combinations E1. Combination of bullet point text structure, 
hyperlink and option wording. 
E2. Combination of bullet point text structure, 
hyperlink and option wording, without 
additional user dialog. 
E3. Combination of missing PUA text, 
hyperlink, without additional user dialog. 
E4. Combination of missing PUA text and 
hyperlink. 
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Table 2: Summary of tested variants, their PUA detection rate and statistical significance over 
the control variant. LG = Live Grid, another user consent dialog. 
Variant Description PUA enabl. P-value Signif. Effect size 
A1: Control Paragraph 
text: Text with 
options 
“Disable 
detection” and 
“Enable 
detection”. 
82.1% – – – 
A2 Bulleted text: 
Text 
description 
bulleted, with 
partial 
bolding. 
82.6% <.05 Yes .007 
B1 Providing 
example: 
Added an 
example to 
end of 
description. 
81.9% >.05 No .005 
B2 Added 
hyperlink: 
“What is a 
potentially 
unwanted 
application?” 
82.2% >.05 No .002 
B3 Added 
hyperlink: 
“Why do we 
82.1% >.05 No .000 
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ask?” 
C1 Coloured 
signal word: 
Added red 
Notice. 
81.9% >.05 No .002 
C2 Added 
warning 
image: 
ANSI-inspired 
pictorial. 
82.1% >.05 No .000 
C3 Added 
warning 
image: 
Company 
warning 
pictorial. 
81.8% >.05 No .004 
D1 Option order 
reversed: 
“Enable 
detection”, 
then “Disable 
detection”. 
88.9% <.001 Yes .097 
D2 Option text 
changed: from 
“Don’t detect” 
to “Detect”. 
79.2% <.001 Yes .037 
D3 Option text 
changed & 
reversed: 
Combines D1 
and D2. 
87.0% <.001 Yes .068 
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E1 No LG & 
hyperlink, 
bulleted text, 
& option text 
changed 
(combines A2, 
B2, D2) 
80.5% <.001 Yes .020 
E2 Combines A2, 
B2, D2. 
80.0% <.001 Yes .026 
E3 No LG & 
hyperlink & 
no text 
description: 
“What is a 
PUA?” 
83.2% <.001 Yes .013 
E4 Added 
hyperlink & 
no text 
description: 
“What is a 
PUA?” 
81.1% <.001 Yes .015 
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Table 3: Summary for all tested variants, hyperlink presence, number of words and reading times, 
all times are in seconds. 
Variant Contain 
hyperlink 
No. of 
words 
Expected 
reading 
time 
Average 
time spent 
on screen 
Median 
time spent 
on the 
screen 
% of 
people 
who spent 
enough 
time on 
screen to 
read it 
A1: 
Control 
No 111 26.64 15.17 8 15.1% 
A2 No 107 25.68 16.27 9 17.8% 
B1 No 123 29.52 15.69 8 14.2% 
B2 Yes 117 28.08 15.87 9 14.1% 
B3 Yes 115 27.60 16.05 9 15.3% 
C1 No 112 26.88 16.03 9 16.5% 
C2 No 111 26.64 15.72 9 16.0% 
C3 No 111 26.64 15.65 9 15.7% 
D1 No 111 26.64 13.23 8 12.0% 
D2 No 108 25.92 16.03 10 16.2% 
D3 No 108 25.92 14.18 9 13.5% 
E1 Yes 64 15.36 21.41 14 46.3% 
E2 Yes 110 25.40 18.21 11 18.3% 
E3 Yes 29 6.96 20.80 11 75.9% 
E4 Yes 75 18.00 19.01 9 25.3% 
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